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RECENT CASES
Administrative LawLICENSE GRANTED UNDER FEDERAL POWER ACT
DOES NOT GIVE MUNICIPALITY POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN OVER STATE-OWNED PROPERTY
At Tacoma's request, the Federal Power Commission 1 issued a license
to the city of Tacoma permitting the construction of two power dams.2
The reservoir to be created by these dams would inundate a portion of a
state owned fish hatchery. Section 21 of the Federal Power Act grants
FPC licensees a general power of eminent domain to procure land necessary for the reservoirs of licensed dams3 In accordance with this license,
Tacoma adopted an ordinance authorizing condemnation of the hatchery.
To determine its authority to finance the dams by a revenue bond issue, the
city commenced suit for declaratory judgment against the taxpayers of
Tacoma and other interested parties.4 The State of Washington was later
substituted as defendant. Defendant state moved to enjoin construction of
the dams contending, inter alia, that Tacoma was without state-conferred
authority to condemn property owned by the state and dedicated to a public
use. The trial court held that it had no jurisdiction to rule upon defendant's contention vis ti vis the city's power to condemn state land. IHowever, it enjoined the city from continuing construction on the ground that
the dams would interfere with navigation in a manner prohibited by state
law. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington reversed both rulings. It held, three judges dissenting,5 that "The federal government may
not confer corporate capacity upon local units of government beyond the
capacity given them by their creator, and the Federal Power Act, as we
read it, does not purport to do so." 6 It further held that since the state
1. Hereinafter cited as FPC.
2. The FPC issues its licenses pursuant to the Federal Power Act, 41 STAT.
1063 (1920), as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-823 (1952). The instant license is recorded
in In the Matter of City of Tacoma, Washington, 10 F.P.C. 424 (1951), aff'd sub
nor. Washington Dep't of Game v. FPC, 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 936 (1954).
3. 41 STAT. 1074 (1920), 16 U.S.C. § 814 (1952).
4. The other parties were the directors of game and fish of the State of Washington. The state was later substituted as defendant.
5. The dissent was based upon a resolution of the conflict posed in the text at
notes 7-17 infra in favor of the federal government.
6. Instant case at 800, 307 P.2d at 577. This issue was reached only after the
court held that the defendants were not precluded by the law of the case or res
judicata by previous litigation concerning these dams. See Washington Dep't of
Game v. FPC, 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954);
City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 43 Wash. 2d 468, 262 P.2d 214 (1953).
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legislature had not granted to Tacoma the power to condemn the hatchery,
Tacoma had no power of eminent domain over the hatchery and that the
injunction should therefore be affirmed. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of
Tacoma, 49 Wash. 2d 781, 307 P.2d 567 (1957), cert. granted, 26 U.S.L.
WEEK 3177 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1957) (No. 509).
Whether the federal government can, over state objection, use an
FPC-licensed municipality to condemn state-owned land is unclear. Two
apparently conflicting doctrines might seem to control the result, the one
relating to state control over its municipalities, and the other holding the
federal government supreme in the development of hydroelectric facilities
on navigable waterways. In Washington and the majority of American
jurisdictions, the courts have long held that municipalities are state instrumentalities, established by the states to aid them in governing on the local
level. 7 Accordingly, a municipality derives its powers by delegation from
its parent state, and may exercise only those powers delegated.8 Federal
courts have recognized the nature of the state-municipal relationship by
refusing-to intervene at the request of the municipality in disputes between
the municipality and its parent state.9 The State of Washington limits its
grants of the power of eminent domain to that contained in acts of the state
legislature and forbids its exercise against state-owned land without state
consent. 10 Reasoning from these doctrines the instant court concluded
that for the federal government to empower an arm of the state to act in a
way forbidden by the state legislature"1 would seriously erode the federal
system. 2 However, this line of reasoning collides with cases holding that
the federal government is supreme in the development of power facilities on
navigable streams. 13 Where state restrictions upon stream development
conflict with federal regulations, the former have been required to yield.
For example, in First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Cooperative v. FPC14 an Iowa
statute requiring that water taken from streams for power purposes be
returned to the same stream was held to be no bar to an FPC licensee to
act under a license which permitted the diversion of almost all of the water
7. Lauterbach v. City of Centralia, 49 Wash. 2d 550, 304 P.2d 656 (1956);
State ex rel Clausen v. Burr, 65 Wash. 524, 118 Pac. 639 (1911); 1 McQUnILAN,
MuNicinAL. CoapoRATioNs § 208 (3d ed. 1949) and cases cited therein.
8. 2 McQUILLAN, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 4.04, 10.03 and cases cited therein.
9. Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 47 (1933);
Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192 (1923); Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182

(1923).
10. Tepley v. Sumerlin, 46 Wash. 2d 504, 507, 282 P.2d 827, 828 (1955) ; State
ex rel. Chesterly v. Superior Court, 19 Wash. 2d 791, 800, 144 P.2d 916, 920 (1944) ;
State v. Superior Court, 91 Wash. 454, 459, 157 Pac. 1097, 1098 (1916); WASH.

Rv. CoDn §§ 8.12, 80.40.010 (1955).
11. The 1957 session of the Washington legislature rejected the Tacoma sponsored
substitute Senate Bill No. 264 which would have authorized the city to acquire the
necessary state land for the Cowlitz project. Brief of the Attorney General on Petition
for Rehearing, p. 11, instant case.
12. Instant case at 800, 307 P.2d at 577.
13. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 171 (1946);
United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 383 (1940).
14. 328 U.S. 152 (1946). See also City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 43
Wash. 2d 468, 483, 262 P.2d 214, 223 (1953).
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of the Cedar River into the Mississippi River. Further complicating resolution of the instant problem is the fact that the federal government may
delegate its power of eminent domain to others, including municipalities. 15
This delegated power, in the case of private corporations, may constitutionally be used to condemn state lands despite the objection of the parent
state.' 6 By extension, it may be that the City of Tacoma can constitutionally exercise the power of eminent domain granted to it by the federal
government to condemn the state-owned fish hatchery despite state opposition. The issue has heretofore not been squarely presented, however, in
that in the past whenever a municipality has exercised the power of eminent
domain under the authority of a federal act, the parent state has either
expressly agreed to or at least has not objected to such action.'1 The instant
court assumed without deciding that it was a proper forum for consideration of the issue and that the issue was squarely before it; it then proceeded
to a resolution on the merits.
Anticipating the conflicts likely to arise between state and federal
interests in the development of hydroelectric power, Congress, in framing
the procedure for procuring a federal license, provided that before the
FPC may issue a license, applicants must submit evidence of compliance
with the requirements of state law.'
An interested state must be given
notice of license applications and may be a party to the FPC hearing.19
A party, including the interested state, aggrieved by an FPC decision on a
license application is entitled first to a rehearing before the FPC and, if not
sustained there, then to review by a court of appeals. 20 A federal forum and'
review procedure is thus made available for litigation of the type of question
involved in the instant action. In fact, Tacoma received its license in a
proceeding to which the State of Washington was a party through the
departments of fish and game and the attorney general. A finding was
made by the FPC that Tacoma ".

.

. has submitted satisfactory evidence

of compliance with the requirements of all applicable state laws insofar as
necessary to effect the purpose of a license for the project . ... , 21
A rehearing was held on the issuance of the license at the behest of the state
and an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Issuance of the license was affirmed and certiorari was denied by the
Supreme Court 22 Apparently at no time during the course of these federal
15. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry., 135 U.S. 641 (1890); Stockton
v. Baltimore & N.Y.R.R., 32 Fed. 9 (C.C.D.N.J. 1887). See Latinette v. St. Louis,
201 Fed. 676 (7th Cir. 1912).
16. Missouri ex rel. Camden County v. Union Elec. Light & Power Co., 42 F.2d
692 (D. Mo. 1930).
17. See, e.g., Latinette v. St. Louis, 201 Fed. 676 (7th Cir. 1912) ; City of Davenport v. 3/5 of an Acre of Land, 147 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ill. 1957).
18. 41 STAT. 1068 (1920), 16 U.S.C. § 802(b) (1952).
19. 41 STAT. 1065 (1920), 16 U.S.C. § 797(f) (1952); 49 STAT. 858 (1935), 16
U.S.C. § 825g (a) (1952) ; 49 STAT. 860 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) (1952).
20. 49 STAT. 860 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 8251 (1952).
21. In the Matter of City of Tacoma, Washington, 10 F.P.C. 424, 439 (1951).
22. Washington Dep't of Game v. FPC, 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954).
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proceedings did the state object that Tacoma would be without authority
to exercise the power of eminent domain over state-owned lands involved
in the project because granted no such right by the state.P The issue
presented by the instant case, therefore, is whether Washington may collaterally attack the federal license in a state proceeding on an issue which
could have been raised before the FPC, as the Washington court assumed,
or whether the FPC proceeding and its subsequent review are binding as
to all issues which were or could have been considered therein.
The Federal Power Act does not in terms specify that the FPC determination of compliance with state law, subject to federal judicial review,
shall prevent the state from making its own determination in a state court,
and legislative history on the point is sparse 2 4 and unhelpful.2 5 However,
the act does state that upon filing for review with a court of appeals,
".. . such court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify or set
aside such order in whole or in part. .. ." and the judgment of the
. shall be final,
court of appeals upon any order of the Commission ".
2.6.
subject to review by the Supreme Court of the United States . .
This language suggests the conclusion that Congress intended that the
federal forum be exclusive and that the states have no jurisdiction in litigation which will set aside FPC licensing.P The history of the act,2 8 the
strong federal interest in efficient development of hydroelectric resources,
the fact that the state may become a party to the licensing procedure, and the
inclusion of the requirement that applicants must present evidence of
compliance with state law before a license is issued all point to the same
conclusion. Further, the fact that the burden of proving compliance with
state law is placed on the applicant tends to show that Congress intended
the FPC to consider and protect the state interests. Prior to the Federal
Power Act and the formation of the FPC, authority to construct a dam on

23. Instant case at 803-05, 813 (dissent). In fact the issue was not raised in the
instant case until the case had been in the state courts for three years.
24. The appeal provisions of the act were passed as a portion of the Public
Utility Holding Companies Act of 1935. This act had other highly controversial sections. Debate and testimony upon these sections overshadowed interest in the appeal
provisions which received rather summary treatment. See Hearings on H.R. 5423 Before the Committee on Interstate and Forezgn Commerce of the House of Representatives, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 387-88, 450 (1935) ; Hearings on S. 1725 Before
the Committee on Interstate Commerce of the Senate, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 233 (1935).
The state law compliance provisions were similarly overshadowed by other issues. See,
e.g., the lack of debate on the section when the House was considering the bill section by
section. 58 CoNG. RWc 2018-40, 2131-39 (1919).
25. Interestingly enough, during the House floor debate upon the eminent domain
provision the question was asked by Congressman Black, ".

.

. IT]he thought occurs

to me that unless the State itself will confer on the municipality or subdivision of a
State the right of eminent domain it is very doubtful as to whether the Federal Government ought to come in and do it." Congressman Stevenson who had the floor at
the time replied, "I appreciate that position but will not discuss it at the present
time." Apparently the issue never again was raised. 58 CONG. REc. 1932 (1919).
26. 49 STAT. 860 (1935), 16 U.S.C. § 8251 (b) (1952).
27. On the other hand, there is at least some judicial support for the proposition
that this does not preclude state determination of ability to act under a license once
granted. Washington Dep't of Game v. FPC, 207 F.2d 391, 396-97 (9th Cir. 1953).
28. 58 CoNrG. Ric. 1935, 1938-39 (1919); S. Rm'. No. 180, 66th Cong., 1st Sess.
5-6 (1919); 59 CONG. RZ3c. 1040 (1920).

752

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 106

navigable waters had to be obtained directly from Congress.29 During the
decade preceding passage of the act development of American water power
resources had reached a standstill because of Congress' inability to agree
30
To break the deadon the terms under which licenses should be granted
lock, facilitate licensing and speed development of our power resources,
the Federal Power Act was enacted. 3 1 Federal licensees were given broad
powers including the power of eminent domain, and municipalities were
However, Congress conceded the wisdesignated as potential licensees.3
dom of recognizing state interests in the form of the presentation to the
FPC of compliance with state law and participation by the state in the
licensing proceedings. Thus, Washington in the instant case had a channel
for consideration of its objections, including judicial review. The broad
purpose of expediting hydroelectric development would be frustrated and
the provisions for recognition of state interests rendered nugatory if the
state were to be permitted to ignore the opportunity to present its objections
to the FPC prior to licensing and then to attack the federal license in a
collateral state proceeding. s
Some judicial support for this conclusion exists. One line of cases,
84
holds that the FPC
including the First Iowa Hydro-Elec. decision,
licensee need only comply with those state laws not in conflict with the
Federal Power Act, thus recognizing the paramount national interest in the
area. Whether or not Congress could provide for the granting of licenses
with no recognition of state interests, these cases suggest that at least
Congress can make the federal forum the exclusive forum for recognition
of these interests. Another line of cases holds that an attempt to enjoin
a licensee of a federal agency from acting under the license, as a collateral
attack upon the license, may not be entertained without making the United
States a party.3 Furthermore, such a suit must be brought in a federal
court0' A suit against an FPC licensee by a private citizen whose lands
are to be condemned to enjoin condemnation on the ground that the grant

29. 59 CONG. Ryc. 1040 (1920).
30. Id. at 1039-40. For a general discussion of the appalling state of the development of American hydroelectric power prior to the passage of the Federal Power
Act see Brown, The Water-Power Problem in the United States, 24 YA, L.J. 12
(1914). See also S. Rx'. No. 180, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1919).
31. 59 CoN. Rzc. 1039-40 (1920); S. Rr,. No. 180, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6
(1919).
32. 41 STAT. 1074 (1920), 16 U.S.C. § 814 (1952); 41 STAT. 1063 (1920), 16
U.S.C. § 796 (5) (1952).
33. Tacoma's attempt to proceed with the construction of the dans has been
delayed almost ten years since the first application for an FPC license in 1948. As
a result, dams which would have increased the hydroelectric potential of the critically
power-short Pacific Northwest by 10% have not been built. Due to increased construction costs the cost of the project has soared. In the Matter of City of Tacoma,
Washington, 10 F.P.C. 424, 425, 435 (1951); Brief for Appellants, pp. 23-24, 63-64,
66-67, instant case.
34. See also City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 43 Wash. 2d 468, 493,
262 P.2d 214, 227-28 (1953).
35. Venner v. Michigan Cent. R-R., 271 U.S. 127, 130 (1926) and cases cited
therein.
36. Venner v. Michigan Cent. R.R., supra note 35.
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of the power of eminent domain is invalid has been held to be a collateral
attack within this doctrine3 7 There appears to be no reason to distinguish
for this purpose between a private owner of land to be condemned and a
state owner, particularly in view of the provision made for protection of
state interests in the licensing procedure itself. The fact that Washington
neither made the FPC a party to the instant case nor had federal consent
to attack the license collaterally in a state proceeding would call for reversal
of the decision under the second line of cases. This, combined with the
paramount federal interest in the development of hydroelectric power, the
purpose of the Federal Power Act, and the adequacy of the procedures
established by it to protect the rights and interests of the states would seem
to make reversal mandatory.

Constitutional LawDENIAL OF ADMISSION TO STATE BAR HELD ON ITS
FACTS A DEPRIVATION OF DUE PROCESS
Admission to the bar of the State of California requires certification
by the State Committee of Bar Examiners to the supreme court of the state 1
that the applicant is of good moral character 2 and that he does not advocate
the forceful overthrow of either the federal or state governments.3 The
burden of proof is upon the applicant. 4 When questioned by the bar
37. Harris v. Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 29 F. Supp. 425 (D.

Neb. 1938). See also Williams v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 89 F. Supp.
485 (W.D.S.C. 1950).
1. "The committee [of bar examiners] shall have power to examine all applicants

for admission to practice law and to administer the requirements for admission to
practice. The committee shall certify to the Supreme Court for admission to practice
law those persons, and only those persons who fulfill the requirements for admission
to practice law provided in The State Bar Act and by these rules." CALi. Bus. & PRoSt.
Com ANx. § 6068, rule 1, sec. 2 (West 1954). See also id. § 6064.
2. "Every applicant shall be of good moral character. Investigations in reference
to the moral character of applicants may be informal, but shall be thorough, with
the object of ascertaining the truth. ... The applicant shall have the burden of proving that he is possessed of good moral character, of removing any and all reasonable
suspicion of moral unfitness, and that he is entitled to the high regard and confidence
of the public." Id. rule 10, sec. 101; see also id. § 6060(c).
3. Id. § 6064.1.
4. See note 2 supra. This allocation of the burden of proof has been sustained
by the California courts. State Bar v. Langert, 43 Cal. 2d 636, 276 P.2d 596 (1954) ;
Spears v. State Bar, 211 Cal. 183, 294 Pac. 697 (1930). In the leading case of Spears
v. State Bar, supra at 190-91, 294 Pac. at 700, the court stated: "Although the committee of bar examiners will make as thorough an investigation as possible, they are
not required to undertake the burden of disproving an applicant's allegations of good
moral character. And if the proof offered by an applicant falls short of convincing
the committee of bar examiners, it is their privilege and their duty to refuse to
recommend such applicant for admission to the bar of this state." A similar standard
of placing the burden of proof on the applicant is maintained in forty-six of the states.
Instant case at 278 n.3 (Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion). See also 18 BAR
ExAmNim 194, 202-03 (1949) ; Comment, Character Requirements for Admiysion to
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examiners 5 petitioner asserted that he did not advocate the overthrow of
the Government by force; but he declined to state whether he was then or
at any time had been a member of the Communist Party,6 basing his refusal
to answer on the claim that the first and fourteenth amendments prevented
the committee from inquiring into his political beliefs and associations. 7 At
the termination of petitioner's several hearings 8 the bar examiners refused
to certify him to the state supreme court on the ground that he failed to
show that he had met the statutory requirements of good moral character
and non-advocacy of violent overthrow of the Government. His petition
for review was denied by the California Supreme Court, four to three,
without opinion. On certiorari the Supreme Court of the United States
reversed, three Justices dissenting, and held that petitioner had been
denied due process of law since the record did not reveal evidence which
could support any reasonable doubts about the petitioner's good moral
character or loyalty to the federal or state governments. Konigsberg v.
State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
Regardless of doctrinal conflicts concerned with whether the practice
of law is a right of the individual applicant or a privilege bestowed by the
state,' the Supreme Court has long been reluctant to interfere with state
the Bar, 20 FoaHAM L Rxv. 305 (1951). The Supreme Court of the United States
has never been asked to rule directly on the constitutionality of this allocation of the
burden of proof of good moral character for admission to the bar. Cf. Douglas v.
Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923) (Supreme Court held constitutional a Washington state
statute delegating to an examining board the duty of determining (1) what standard
of fitness and knowledge are to be required of applicants for a license to practice
dentistry in the state, and (2) whether each individual applicant satisfies the standards) ; People ex rel. Lieberman v. De Carr, 199 U.S. 552 (1905) ; Reetz v. Michigan,
188 U.S. 505 (1903) (holding constitutional the establishment of a similar medical
board of examiners); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889). See Brown &
Fassett, Loyalty Tests for Admission to the Bar, 20 U. CHL L. REV. 480, 494 (1953).
5. Testimony of an ex-communist that petitioner had attended meetings of a
Communist Party unit in 1941, a series of vituperative editorials written by petitioner
for a local newspaper just before his entry into law school, and statements made
by the petitioner in 1947 before the California Senate Fact Finding Committee on
Un-American Activities had raised doubts in the minds of the committee members
concerning petitioner's good moral character, despite his commendable war record
and the letters of forty-two individuals he introduced as attesting to his good moral
character. Instant case at 264-72.
6. Petitioner stated, during the first hearing, that he was not a philosophical
communist, as distinguished from a member of the Communist Party. But, at later
hearings, he admitted that this answer was inconsistent with his general position and
stated that he would not answer the same question if it were again asked of him.
Instant case at 293-94, 296-98 (dissenting opinion).

7. Petitioner further contended that the committee had no right under its statutory
powers to ask such questions, and that such questions were not relevant to an inquiry
into his moral character. The Court, however, did not speak to these contentions.
8. The first three hearings were held by the Southern Sub-committee of the
Committee of Bar Examiners; the final de novo hearing was held before the full
Committee of Bar Examiners. Instant case at 260 n.13.
9. Justice Frankfurter dissented on jurisdictional grounds without reaching the
merits. Instant case at 274. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Clark, dissented from the
majority opinion on both jurisdictional and substantive grounds. Instant case at 276.
Justice Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
10. See In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) ; Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
333 (1866). See Note, The Right To Practice Law, 1 DuxE B.J. 249 (1951).
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denials of admission to practice this and other licensed professions, leaving
the states generally free to set standards for admission that are as rigorous
or as lenient as they deem fit."- However, sporadically, the guarantees of
the Federal Constitution against state infringement of individual rights have
been the basis of review by the Supreme Court of state denials of admission to professional practice. 12 These cases, while asserting that an applicant for admission will be federally protected from state standards that
are arbitrary or that have no "rational connection with . . . fitness or

capacity to practice law," 13 indicate that the Court has not readily upset
a state determination of proper standards for admission. Thus, in In Re
Summers' 4 the Supreme Court refused to overturn a state's refusal to
admit a conscientious objector to the bar who for religious reasons declined
to take an oath to support the state constitution, as required of all applicants. 15 In the instant case and in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,1

decided the same day, the Supreme Court for the first time reviewed a
state's application of an assumedly valid admission's standard to the facts
of a particular applicant's case. In Schware the state supreme court had
upheld denial of the application on the ground that the applicant's use of
aliases, his record of arrests and particularly his membership in the Communist Party-all occurring during the depression and all freely admitted
11. "The legislature may undoubtedly prescribe qualifications for the office [of
attorney and counsellor], to which he [the applicant for admission to the bar] must
conform... ." Ex parte Garland, supra note 10, at 379; Virgin Islands Bar Ass'n
v. Dench, 124 F. Supp. 257 (D. Virgin Islands 1953); Application of Fink, 109 F.
Supp. 729 (D.C. Alaska), aff'd, 208 F2d 898 (9th Cir. 1953); Brents v. Stone, 60 F.
Supp. 82 (E.D. Ill. 1945). See note 12 infra.
12. The instances of this review are rare: In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945)
(see text and notes at notes 14-15 infra); In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894)
(the Court ruled it was for the Virginia courts to construe the meaning of the word
"person' in the Virginia statute governing admission to the bar; a denial of admission to a woman held not to violate the privileges and immunities clauses of the Constitution); Bradwell v. State 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (Illinois' denial to
a woman of admission to the Illinois bar violates no provision of the Constitution;
the right of a state to prescribe the qualifications for admission to the bar of its
own courts is unaffected by the fourteenth amendment); cf. Ex parte Secombe, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 9 (1856); In re Anastaplo, 3 Ill. 2d 471, 121 N.E.2d 826 (1954),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 348 U.S. 946 (1955) (a case remarkably similar
on its facts to the instant case). In no one of these cases did the Supreme Court
reverse the determination of the state court.
13. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
14. 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
15. "Thus a court created to administer the laws of Illinois as it understands them,
and charged particularly with the protection of justice in the courts of Illinois through
supervision of admissions to the bar, found itself faced with the dilemma of excluding
an applicant whom it deemed disqualified for the responsibilities of the profession of
law or of admitting the applicant because of its deeply rooted tradition in freedom of
belief. The responsibility for choice as to the personnel of its bar rests with Illinois.
Only a decision which violated a federal right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment
would authorize our intervention." Id. at 570-71. Apart from the decision in the instant
case, the authority of the Summers case is weakened by the fact that the Court, in
deciding that Illinois' action did not violate the fourteenth amendment's guarantees
of religious freedom, relied heavily on the decisions in United States v. Schwimmer,
279 U.S. 644 (1929), and United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), both
subsequently overruled by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
16. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
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by the applicant-revealed the applicant to be of questionable moral character.17 On certiorari the Supreme Court reviewed the facts before the
state supreme court and held that in view of Schware/s affirmative showing
of good moral character in the period after 1940, the evidence relied upon
by the state could not rationally justify a determination that the applicant
presently "was morally unfit to practice law," thereby depriving him of
due process of law.' 8 Similarly, in the instant case the Court held that
even though petitioner refused to answer questions concerning his political
affiliations, there was no evidence in the record which rationally justified a
finding that the petitioner had failed to show good moral character or nonadvocacy of violent overthrow of the Government. 19
In reaching its decision in Konigsberg, the Court did not attempt to
question either of the state requirements for admission-good moral character and non-advocacy of violent overthrow of the Government; nor did it
challenge the state's imposition on the applicant of the burden of proof
of both of these requirements. Further, the Court stated that it was not
confronted with the issue of whether the state could deny admission solely
on the ground of the applicant's refusal to answer questions, since the state
technically had not couched its determination in these terms but rather had
denied admission on the ground that the applicant had failed to sustain his
burden of proving good moral character and non-advocacy of violent overthrow of the Government." The- Court framed the issue as, "does the
evidence in the record support any reasonable doubts about Konigsberg's
good character or his loyalty to the Governments of State and Nation ?"21
It concluded that "evidence [did] not rationally support the only two
grounds upon which the Committee relied in rejecting his application

...

."2

thereby denying Konigsberg due process and equal protec-

tion of the law.3

Taken literally, this formulation of the constitutional

17. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 60 N.M. 304, 319, 291 P2d 607, 617
(1955).

18. 353 U.S. at 246-47.
19. Instant case at 273.
20. Id. at 259-62.
21. Id. at 262.
22. Ibid. See id. at 273.
23. At several juncture's in the majority's opinion Justice Black indicates that
the petitioner was denied equal protection of the law. Id. at 262, 273. "If this contention
is correct [that there was no evidence in the record which rationally supports a doubt
about Konigsberg's character or loyalty] . . . California's refusal to admit him
[Konigsberg] is a denial of due process and of equal protection of the laws because
both arbitrary and discriminatory." Id. at 262. Since there was no evidence that the
state had in fact imposed heavier proof requirements on the petitioner than it imposes
on other applicants for admission, the necessary implication of the Court's statement
would seem to be that an arbitrary finding is itself a denial of equal protection, presumably on the theory that an arbitrary finding is divergence in treatment from the
normal run of cases in which the finding could not be termed arbitrary. If the above
does not explain the Court's position with respect to equal protection, it perhaps can
be rationalized on the theory that the state required a higher standard of proof from
the petitioner than it requires from other applicants, even though no evidence was
offered on this point. It would seem that such a determination would admit of no
distinction between persons who are not suspected of subversive activity and those
against whom the state has some evidence indicating possible communist affiliation.
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question implies a significant enlargement of the Court's jurisdiction to
review state actions.
Traditionally, when a party seeks federal judicial review of state
action taken against the interest of that party on the theory that the substantive basis upon which the state has acted offends due process of law,
the Court has formulated the constitutional question as whether the state's
grounds depriving an individual of life, liberty or property are so arbitrary
or unreasonable as to deny the affected party due process of law.2 4 The
state basis for action is then compared with a constitutional standard to
determine the validity of the action taken by the state.2 Where the constitutional challenge is to the standard or standards devised by the state
to determine the action it will take with respect to a party, the state standard
is itself measured against the constitutional test. 2 Thus, in the instant
case there could have been a ruling on whether the state could constitutionally exclude from membership in its bar a person who does not have
good moral character or who advocates violent overthrow of the Government. However, when the validity of the state standard is itself unchallenged, the due process question can still- be raised on the allegation that
the standard as applied is unconstitutional.2 7 The Court then treats the
facts or evidence before the state decision-making body as if it were the
state standard or grounds for action and determines whether on the basis
of such facts or evidence the state could constitutionally have taken the
action that it did in fact take. This determination is made by measuring
the facts or evidence serving as the basis for the state action against a
constitutional test which will take into account the interests of the state
in the matter. If the consequence of such a balancing is a conclusion that
the state action is unreasonable or is arbitrary, the Court holds that due
process has been violated 8 In the context of the instant case the question
for decision under this view would be whether it was reasonable for the
state to deny petitioner admission to the bar on the basis of the facts in the
record before the state committee of bar examiners. However, the Court in
the instant case stated the due process issue to be whether the evidence
could reasonably support a finding by the state that its-the state's-standard had been met.29 Thus, sufficiency of the evidence itself would appear to
be a constitutional due process question. If the Konigsberg opinion be
accepted at face value, a litigant seeking to raise a due process issue entitling
him to federal review of a state decision need only allege that the evidence
in the record could not reasonably support a state finding that the standard,
24. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Weiman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183 (1952); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697 (1931) ; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
25. Ibid.
26. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Weiman v. Updegraff,

344 U.S. 183 (1952) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
27. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380
(1927) ; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
28. Ibid.

29. Instant case at 262.
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as defined by the state, had or had not been met. Under this view it would
be irrelevant that the state, on the evidence before it, constitutionally could
have taken the action in question. For example, federal judicial review
would appear to be available to a state criminal defendant on due process
grounds on an allegation that the evidence was inadequate to sustain a determination that an offense had been committed 30 As an extreme illustration, it would seem that a federal due process question would be raised
on an allegation by the losing defendant in a negligence action that the evidence could not reasonably support a finding of negligence, even though it
be conceded that the state on the facts before it could impose absolute
liability on the defendant with constitutional impunity.31
While there are several statements in the Konigsberg opinion indicat2
ing that the Court viewed the constitutional question in traditional terms,3
the Court's framing of the issue, its recitation of the holding and the outline
of the opinion afford substantial support for the contention that a new
constitutional due process question has been recognized. Similarly, in the
Schware case, there is language to support the same proposition,3 although
the opinion as a whole is generally more equivocal than that in Konigsberg.3 4
But despite the language in Konigsberg and to a lesser extent the language
in Schware, it appears unlikely that the Court could have intended to so
substantially enlarge the scope of its jurisdiction to review state decisions
in view of the ramifications of such a position on federal-state relations.35
The decisional formula in Konigsberg might be explained in part by reference to the state announced standards for admission. To the extent that
"good moral character" approximates the constitutional standard against
which the Court under the traditional view would have weighed the evidence, the Court may have assimilated the constitutional standard into that
of the state. The breadth and indefiniteness of "good moral character"
would seem to facilitate such an assimilation. However, such a treatment
hardly would seem probable with respect to "non-advocacy of violent overthrow of the Government," which in addition to being specific is unlikely
to be in itself a constitutional test. 6 Finally, even if the Court is establish30. Dictum by Justice Holmes in Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25,
30 (1917), would seem to be contra to the position in text. "Whenever a wrong
judgment is entered against a defendant his property is taken when it should not have
been, but whatever the ground may be, if the mistake is not so gross as to he impossible in a rational administration of justice, it is no more than the imperfection of
man, not a denial of constitutional rights." (civil case). See Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322
U.S. 596, 605 (1944) (dictum).
31. But see Jones v. Buffalo Creek Coal & Coke Co., 245 U.S. 328, 329 (1917):
. error of a trial judge in admitting evidence or entering judgment after full
hearing does not constitute a denial of due process of law." Cf. Lehigh Water Co. v.
Easton, 121 U.S. 388, 392 (1887).
32. Instant case at 273-74.
33. 353 U.S. at 239, 246.
34. See text at notes 35-36 infra.
35. See notes 30, 31 supra.
36. If the constitutional test approximates "fitness to practice law," it would not
seem that non-advocacy of violent overthrow of the Government in itself so approximates the constitutional standards as to be a fair substitute for it. Rather the loyalty
test would seem to be a basis upon which an inference of general fitness could be
drawn.
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ing, as has been suggested, a new ground for federal due process review
of state actions, it is possible that it is limited to subject matter roughly akin
to that involved in the instant case, i.e., public employment and public
licensed professional employment. Its application to criminal or, even more
remotely, civil proceedings would seem dubious.
Apart from the problem of the enlargement of the Court's jurisdiction
to review state action, the Konigsberg case poses other difficult issues
involving a state's right to set requirements for admission to its bar and
to impose the burden of proof upon the applicant. In reaching its decision the Court reviewed the evidence relevant to each of the state qualifications. With respect to "good moral character" the Court considered
whether any inference of doubtful character could be drawn from the
applicant's refusal to answer when based on a claim that the first amendment barred inquiry into his political beliefs. 3 7 Without deciding the
validity of the claim,38 it concluded that since the applicant's contention was
not substantively frivolous and was made in good faith, the state could
not draw any unfavorable inference from his refusal to answer.3 9 Determining that the state had no other unfavorable evidence against the applicant, the Court proceeded to find the state decision arbitrary. With
respect to the second standard, non-advocacy of violent overthrow of the
Government, the Court found no evidence unfavorable to the applicant and
likewise ruled the state decision on the issue arbitrary. It reached this
conclusion without considering whether any inference of disloyalty could
be drawn from his refusal to answer. 40 The Court evidently disposed of
37. Instant case at 269-71.
38. Further proceedings in this or in similar cases at the state level squarely
could raise the issue of the validity of the claim of privilege and the issue of whether
the refusal to answer relevant questions itself can be the basis of a denial of admission, were the state to couch its denial in these terms. Justice Harlan's dissent in
the instant case answers the former question in the negative by declaring that the
applicant had no valid claim to remain silent, and indicates that the latter issue should
be determined in the affirmative. Instant case at 279-82. It would seem that one available
basis for a decision on a subsequent denial contrary to that espoused by the dissent
in the instant case would be on a basis comparable to that employed by the majority in the instant case in holding that no unfavorable evidentiary inference could
be drawn from the applicant's refusal to answer. The Court could reason that the
sanction of nonadmission to the bar could not be invoked where the applicant refuses
to answer relevant questions in "good faith" reliance on a substantial constitutional
claim of privilege. However, it must be realized that such a holding is tantamount to
recognition of a privilege, regardless of whether the Court states it is reaching its result
without deciding the issue. Such a conclusion would also totally vitiate the utility
of the state admission standard of loyalty, heretofore unchallenged by the Court.
Another avenue would be open to the Court, even assuming that it first determined that the applicant was not privileged. If the question that the defendant refused to answer could not reasonably be expected to produce information that will not
materially advance the inquiry of the bar examiners, a denial of admission based
on a refusal to answer such a question could be deemed arbitrary and hence offensive
to fourteenth amendment due process. However, in the context of the instant case
the question of the applicant's present membership in the Communist Party would
appear to be highly relevant to the issue of whether the applicant advocates the
violent overthrow of the Government by force, with the result that a denial of admission on the basis of his refusal to answer would not be arbitrary.
39. Id. at 270.
40. Id. at 271-72. With regard to testimony of a witness that the applicant had
been a member of the Communist Party in 1941, the Court attacked the probative
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the burden of proof issue under both standards, either by viewing it as
having been met by the applicant's evidence of good character and loyalty
adduced from witnesses appearing in his behalf, or by treating the burden
of disproving good moral character and non-advocacy of violent overthrow
of the Government as falling upon the state, despite the plain state language
to the contrary.
If the question on review in the instant case were the sufficiency of the
evidence to meet the state standard, the holding of the Court presumably
can be averted by the state merely by redefining the state standard to impose
a higher burden of proof on the applicant, since review of the sufficiency
of the evidence is premised on an acceptance by the Court of the content
of the state standard. The establishment of a more rigorous proof burden
would, however, itself be subject to constitutional challenge. On the other
hand, if the Court reviewed in traditional constitutional terms, the decision
implies due process limits on the extent of the proof burden that a state
can require of an applicant for admission, at least where the inquiry concerns the applicant's political beliefs. The state apparently may not set
the burden of proof to require more disclosure on the part of the applicant
than his naked assertion that he does not advocate the violent overthrow
of the Government. This has the additional effect of weakening the loyalty
standard itself. Such an erosion of either the burden of proof or the requirement of loyalty may be entirely proper. But to reach it-even if the
due process issue be framed simply as the adequacy of the evidence to
support a finding-would seem to demand consideration not merely of
the inferences to be drawn from evidence in the record but also of the
interests of the state which might give it the right to impose high standards
and a high burden of proof on those who seek to practice law.

SecurityPERFECTION OF SECURITY INTEREST UNDER
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REQUIRES FILING
IN ALL PLACES DESIGNATED IN SECTION 9-401
Petitioner, equipment company, sold certain store equipment to a
proprietor under two installment sales contracts, reserving in each a security
interest.1 In an attempt to perfect this security interest under the Uniform
value of the evidence as relevant to the applicant's character and went on to state
that even if the applicant had been a member of that party, he could not be refused

admission on that ground. Id. at 268-70, citing the Schware case. It would seem,
however, that even though past membership in the Communist Party is not of itself
sufficient to support a denial of admission, it is relevant to a determination of whether
the applicant presently advocates violent overthrow of the Government.

1. The equipment company immediately assigned these contracts along with their

respective installment notes to the bank. At the oral argument the trustee abandoned
his earlier contention that the bank, as assignee of the notes and contracts, was the
real party in interest under rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Commercial Code,2 the petitioner filed copies of the contracts together with
financing statements at the office of the prothonotary of the county in which
the purchaser's stores were located. Before payment of the full purchase
price had been completed, purchaser filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy
and was adjudicated a bankrupt. Following the appointment of a trustee
in bankruptcy, the equipment company brought a reclamation petition,
asserting an interest superior to that of the trustee. Subsequently, it filed
copies of the sales agreements with financing statements with the Secretary of the Commonwealth. The district court, affirming the referee in
bankruptcy, dismissed the reclamation petition, holding that the equipment
company's failure to file in the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth
prior to the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy prevented it from
perfecting its security interest against the trustee in bankruptcy, who acquires the status of a lien creditor from that date.a In re Luckenbill, 156
F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
Prior to article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (and still the rule
in most jurisdictions), creation of secured interests in personal property,
valid against other creditors of the debtor, generally necessitated compliance
with statutes applicable to each of the available security devices. 4 Where
the debtor retained or acquired possession of the collateral,6 the statutes
required recording of the agreement in a designated public office as notice
in order to prevent the misleading of third parties." However, since the
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A (Purdon 1956) (hereinafter cited as UCC). Pennsylvania was the first state to adopt the code, approving it April 6, 1953, effective July 1,
1954. Massachusetts adopted the code in 1957, effective Oct. 1, 1958. Massachusetts,
however, has adopted the 1957 official edition which revises in part the 1952 draft
enacted in Pennsylvania. See Note, The Uniform Commercial Code: Mlajor Differences
Between Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, 71 HARv. L. R~v. 674 (1958).
3. Section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT. 565 (1898), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 110(c) (1952) provides: ". . . [T]he trustee, as to all property, whether or
not coming into possession or control of the court, upon which a creditor of the bankrupt could have obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings at the date of bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested as of such date with all the rights, remedies, and powers
of a creditor then holding a lien thereon by such proceedings, whether or not such a
creditor actually exists."
4. E.g., Sammet v. Mayer, 108 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1939) (failure to file a chattel
mortgage where debtor retained possession of pledged stock invalidated transaction
as against other creditors of bankrupt) ; In the Matter of Lindsay, 131 F. Supp. 11
(D.N.J. 1955) (failure to file conditional sales contract until after petition in bankruptcy subordinated reclamation petitioner's claim to that of the trustee in bankruptcy); Chichester v. Commercial Credit Co., 37 Cal. App. 2d 439, 99 P.2d 1083
(1940) (filing of trust receipt with secretary of state protected creditor against claims
of bankrupt's other creditors and trustee in bankruptcy). See Hanna, The Extension
of Public Recordation, 31 CoLum. L. REv. 617, 622-23 (1931); Storke & Sears,
The PerennialProblem of Security Priority and Recordation, 24 RocKY MT. L. REv.
180 (1951).
5. Where the creditor takes possession of the collateral, as in a common-law
pledge, the statutes have not required filing on the theory that third parties are not
misled into relying on the asset as security for an extension of credit. Hanna, supra
note 4.
6. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3016.4 (West 1954) (Uniform Trust Receipts Act);
CAl. CIV. CODE § 2957 (West 1954) (Mortgage of Personal Property Act); N.J.
REv. STAT. § 46:32-13 (1940) (Uniform Conditional Sales Act); N.J. REv. STAT.
§ 46:28-5 (1940) (Chattel Mortgage Act) ; N.J. Rzv. STAT. § 46:35-7 (1940) (Uniform Trust Receipts Act).
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filing of each type of security device was governed by its own statutedrawn without regard to the provisions of statutes governing other security devices-a creditor who sought actual notice of prior interests in
property of the debtor was forced to search all the offices which might
contain a document covering potential collateral
The complexities resulting from the ad hoc development of personal property security devices
fomented passage of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, marking
the first unified statutory scheme of regulating all personal property security
interests, regardless of the particular device employed.8
Part 3 of article 9 establishes the rules governing priorities among
conflicting claimants to a debtor's collateral.9 Under section 9-301 (1) an
"unperfected" security interest ID is subordinated to the rights of, among
others, "a lien creditor who becomes such without knowledge of the security
interest and before it is perfected. . ., 11 In harmony with the Bankruptcy Act,'- subsection 3 of section 9-301 confers upon a trustee in bankruptcy the status of a lien creditor from the date of the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy. Subject to certain exceptions, perfection of a security
interest against a subsequent lien creditor requires filing of a financing
statement.' 3
Section 9-401 (1) (a) provides that the place for filing a
7. The Pennsylvania situation existing prior to the enactment of the UCC is
typical. Trust receipts were filed with the Department of State and with the prothonotary of the county in which the debtor's principal place of business was located.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 563 (repealed). Filings under the Factors Lien Act were
only with the prothonotary of the county in which the collateral was located. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 6, § 223 (repealed). Conditional sales contracts were filed in the county in
which the collateral was first kept for use by the buyer after the sale. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 69, § 403 (repealed). Chattel mortgages were recorded where the collateral
was located, as well as in the county of the debtor's residence. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

21, § 940.8 (repealed). See Pennsylvania Bar Association notes on the UCC following PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-401 (Purdon 1956). See also the appendix to Hanna,
supra note 4, at 638 for a collection of statutes covering mortgaged personal property
throughout the United States.
8. For discussion and criticism of the sales article generally, see BIRNBAUM,
SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL CODE (1954);

Bane,

Chattel Security Comes of Age; Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1 Dt
PAUL L. REV. 91 (1951) ; Gilmore, Secured Transactions-The Uniform Commercial
Code, 2 Bus. L. Rxv. 152 (1955) ; Kripke, The "Secured Transactions" Provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 VA. L. REV. 577 (1949); Spivak, In Re Article 9,
28 TEMP. L.Q. 603 (1955). For analysis of the problems existing under the prior
legislation see Gilmore & Axelrod, ChattelSecurity, 57 YALE LJ.517 (1948) ; Dunham,

Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing,62 HARv.L. REV. 588 (1949).

9. See Ireton, Prioritiesand Rights of Third Parties,in NATIONAL COMMERCIAL
9 oF TiH UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE (1953).
10. UCC § 9-302 determines whether filing is necessary to perfect a security interest. Section 9-401 prescribes the proper place for filing and the effect of erroneous filing. The information that must be disclosed in the statement filed under § 9-401
is determined by reference to § 9-402. Under § 9-402, the secured party may file
FINANCE, COnFERENCE, SYMPosIum ON ARTICLE

either a financing statement especially prepared for the purpose of filing or a copy of

the contract creating the security interest, provided that it contains the requisite
information. UCC § 9-402(1).

11. UCC § 9-301 (1) (c).
12. See note 3 supra.
13. UCC § 9-302.
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financing statement covering a security interest in non-farm equipment' 4
is in the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth and "if all of the
debtor's places of business are in a single county, in the office of the prothonotary in that county." 15 The consequence of incomplete or erroneous
filing is ameliorated by the provision in section 9-401(2) that filing made
in good faith but not in all the places required by section 9-401 (1) is
"nevertheless effective with regard to any collateral as to which the filing
was proper and with regard to all collateral against any person who has
knowledge of the filing of a financing statement which indicates that a
security in all collateral wherever located was intended." "I The instant
court dismissed the reclamation petition, holding that the petitioner's failure
to file his security interest in the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth prior to the trustee's acquisition of a lien could not be cured by
the saving provisions of 9-401(2).
Unless subsection 2 of section 9-401 relieves the petitioner of the
necessity of filing with the Secretary of the Commonwealth, failure to
comply with section 9-401 (1) (a) precludes perfection of his security
interest. Subsection 9-401(2) was apparently intended to cover two
basic situations, neither of which are present in the instant case.17 The
clause providing that a filing "is nevertheless effective with regard to any
collateral as to which the filing was proper" contemplates situations in
which a single financing statement is employed to cover secured interests
in several types of personal property. As to that portion of the collateral
to which the filing would be effective had a separate financing statement
been filed with respect to that property, the security interest is perfected,
regardless of the fact that the filing is ineffective to perfect a security as to
14. "Equipment" is defined in UCC § 9-109(2).
15. UCC § 9-401 (1) (a). Under § 9-401 the place of filing is determined by the
nature of the collateral involved rather than the form of the security device employed.
The immediate effect of this system is that security information pertaining to a
specific item of collateral can now be found in at least one designated place, alleviating the burden of multiple searches. The resulting simplicity which facilitates the
securing of actual notice is lauded in Kupfer, Filing Provisions, in NATIONAL ComLmcAL FINAxCE CONFERNCE, op. cit. mipra note 9, at 25.
Under § 9-202 the old forms of security devices may still be used, although the
ensuing legal relations will be determined under the code. However, the code's filing
system avoids the problem of the court's construing one type of security device to
be another, e.g., a conditional sales contract to be a chattel mortgage, which would
usually result in the instrument being filed in the wrong office and thus invalid as
against subsequent creditors. See In re Ford-Rennie Leather Co., 2 F.2d 750 (D. Del.
1924) ; Interstate Ice & Power Corp. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 243 N.Y. 95, 152

N.E. 476 (1926).
16. UCC § 9-401(2). For the revised version of this section appearing in the 1957
Official Edition of the code see note 22 infra.
17. Both clauses of § 9401(2) are subject to the condition that the filing be in
"good faith." See text at note 16 supra. The comment to § 9-401(2) does not explain this requirement and it is difficult to conjure up a likely instance of an
attempt to comply with the filing requirements made in bad faith. Since in most
situations the misfilings will be the unintended result of a bona fide attempt to file
properly, it is suggested that the courts establish a presumption of good faith arising
on the showing of a misfiling when dealing with this section. This would relieve the
claimant of the burden of bringing forth sufficient evidence to convince the court
of his good faith.
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other property designated in the same financing statement.18 Arguably
this same result logically could be achieved under section 9-401 without
resort to a separate provision. However, the redundancy can be explained
by reference to prior judicial treatment of security arrangements indicating
that courts, unless bound by express language, might construe a partial
error in filing to vitiate the entire filing. 19 The second clause of section
9-401(2) provides that knowledge of the filing of a financing statement
is effective to perfect an interest against a person having such knowledge 20
The instant petitioner contended that filing in the county office would constitute constructive notice, fulfilling the requirement of knowledge in this
clause and thereby perfecting its security interest. The court, however,
properly rejected this contention on the ground that imputing knowledge
from an incomplete filing would vitiate the requirement of a dual filing 2 '
under subsection 9-401(1). 2
Thus, since a subsequent lien creditor
18. In the instant case had the proprietor agreed that his family car should serve
as part of the collateral for sale, the office of the county prothonotary would be the
only required place in which to file under § 9-401 (1) (b), since the car would be
classified as consumer goods under UCC 9-109(1). The financing statements having
been filed in the county office, the interest in the car would be perfected.
19. E.g., General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Haley, 329 Mass. 559, 109 N.E.2d
143 (1952) (omission of the word "Inc." after creditor's name rendered his filing
of a trust receipt ineffective). See BIRNBAUM, op. cit. supra note 8, at 5, for a
discussion of this tendency.
20. By implication from the language of §§ 9-401(1) and (2) a complete failure
to file prevents the perfection of the security interest, even where the person against
whom the security interest is sought to be exerted has knowledge of the existence of
the interest. Nevertheless, § 9-301(1) by negative inference provides that an unperfected security interest will prevail over lien creditors who become such with knowledge of the security interest and over certain other classes of persons whose interests arise after acquisition of knowledge of a prior security interest.
21. The filing system of the code is designed to facilitate acquisition of information with regard to security interests. To that end, as comment 1 to section
9-401 reveals, reliance is placed principally on central filing in a single state office, thus
relieving creditors of the necessity of searching a "multitude of local offices." However, in the case, for example, of security interests in equipment, as a concession to
local creditors of debtors having their place or places of business in one county,
provision is also made for filing in an office in that county. Although this dual filing
burden on certain creditors is minimal, it may provide a trap for the unwary; rather
than failing to file locally and risking subsequent judicial determination that for the
purposes of section 9-401(1) (a) the "debtor's places of business" were in one county,
careful creditors probably will be well advised to file locally as a matter of course
when confronted with a situation that could require dual filing. The creditor in the
instant case somewhat anomalously filed locally but neglected originally to file at the
state office. His action may be attributable to the fact that under the former Pennsylvania conditional sales and chattel mortgage statutes filing was required only locally.
See note 7 supra.
22. Section 9-401 (2) has been amended in the 1957 Official Edition of the UCC to
read as follows: "A filing which is made in good faith in an improper place or not
in all of the places required by this section is nevertheless effective with regard to
any collateral as to which the filing complied with the requirements of this Article
and is also effective with regard to collateral covered by the financing statement against
any person who has knowledge of the contents of such financing statement." The express reason for the change in language of this section by the drafters was "to make
it clear that the filing to be effective with respect to a particular item of collateral
must have been made in both places" where dual filing is applicable. "It was never
intended that filing in only one of two required places with respect to a particular
item of collateral should be effective except as against one with actual knowledge."

ALI,
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without actual knowledge would take precedence over petitioner's interest,
the trustee in bankruptcy has a like status under section 70(c) of the
Bankruptcy Act.P
23. See note 3 supra. The code would seem to hold out one small chance of success
to holders of unperfected security interests situated similarly to the instant petitioner.
As noted, section 9-301(1) (c) makes an unperfected security interest subordinate to "a
lien creditor who becomes such without knowledge of the security interest and before
it is perfected." Subsection 3 of that section defines a "lien creditor" to include "an
assignee for benefit of creditors . . . and a trustee in bankruptcy." It then goes
on to state that, "Unless all the creditors represented had knowledge of the security
interest such a representative of creditors is a lien creditor without knowledge even
though he personally has knowledge of the security interest." Assuming the creditors
of the debtor and the trustee to have knowledge of the security interest ("knowledge"
here probably requiring actual knowledge), the secured party's argument would proceed as follows: "[S]uch a representative of creditors" in subsection 3 includes not only
the assignee for benefit of creditors mentioned in the preceding sentence, but also the
trustee in bankruptcy. If all the creditors and the trustee have actual knowledge,
then inferentially the sentence beginning "Unless all the creditors" indicates that
the trustee is a lien creditor with knowledge and hence the unperfected security
is not subordinate to his rights under subsection 9-301 (1) (c). However, the trustee
in bankruptcy should nevertheless prevail on the theory that section 70(c) of the
Bankruptcy Act does not make his status as a superior lien creditor depend upon
existing creditors, but merely upon the possibility of a superior lien creditor existing,
i.e., a lien creditor without actual knowledge in this situation. See text of section
70(c) at note 3 supra. The court would then be under a duty, by virtue of the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, to uphold
this interpretation of section 70(c) if correct, even though the state law expressed
in section 9-301(3) of the code conflicts. The constitutional problem might be simply
avoided by construing "such a representative of creditors" to refer only to "assignee
for benefit of creditors" in the preceding sentence.

